Abstract: We study the interaction of a …rm that invests in research and, if successful, undertakes a practice to exploit the innovation, and an enforcer that sets legal standards, …nes and accuracy. In this setting deterrence on actions interacts with deterrence on research. When the practice increases expected welfare the enforcer commits not to intervene by choosing a more rigid per-se legality rule to boost investment, moving to a more ‡exible discriminating rule combined with type-I accuracy for higher probabilities of social harm. Patent and antitrust policies act as substitutes in our setting; additional room for per-se (illegality) rules emerges when …nes are bounded. Our results on optimal legal standards extend from the case of (uncertain) investment in research to the case of (deterministic) investment in physical assets.
Introduction
In recent years, many important antitrust cases on abuse of dominance and monopolization have involved technological market leaders or incumbents owning essential infrastructures. In their investigations, competition agencies have scrutinized a wide range of business strategies that the dominant …rms allegedly used to maintain and increase their market power, from rebates to tying, from interoperability to margin squeeze. At the same time those investigations have not directly questioned the investment decisions of the incumbents. Although investments typically fall outside the scope of antitrust intervention, its impact on research or physical investment is one of the relevant issues to judge the desirability of public intervention. This paper studies optimal antitrust intervention, both in terms of legal standards and enforcement tools, in industries where the incumbent's investment plays a fundamental role.
Looking at competition policy in the last decade, many cases have involved dominant …rms in high-tech industries, that reached the role of technological market leaders due to successful research investments and innovation. In the American and European cases Microsoft was alleged of foreclosure on a number of practices such as bundling of the operating system and the browser or media player applications, loyalty rebates granted to PC producers and limited access, a mild form of refusal to deal, through a reduction in interoperability of the servers'and clients'operating systems. The record …ne to Intel in the case before the European Commission was motivated, among other conducts, by foreclosure through loyalty rebates. In the last years the focus of antitrust enforcement seems to be moving towards new technological leaders as Google and Apple. Although the enforcers investigated particular business practices, the debate in competition policy has then raised new issues on the impact of antitrust enforcement on the innovative activity that characterizes these industries. For instance the commitments imposed in the EC v. Microsoft decisions to disclose the API codes of the server operating system to competitors, have been commented not only in their ability to restore competition, but also in their indirect adverse e¤ects on the incentives to innovate.
Other antitrust proceedings have focussed on the business practices of dominant …rms in network industries, as electricity, gas or telecommunications, where the liberalization has led, through a combination of antitrust and regulatory interventions, to opening the access of networks to competitors. The primary goal of competition agencies, then, has been to prevent the incumbent from using business practices to restrict the ability of newcomers to compete. Technical conditions of access, including interoperability, and price abuses in the form of predation, margin squeeze and aggressive rebates, have been at the core of cases involving the telecom incumbents in Europe, This brief summary highlights some major aspects of the recent discussion. First, industrial organization o¤ers di¤erent and diverging results on the impact on welfare of several business practices at the center of important antitrust cases. While some economists argue that dominant …rms adopt socially harmful practices to maintain their market power, others consider this possibility skeptically, stressing instead the pursuit of superior e¢ ciency as the driving force explaining the emergence of market leaders. 3 Hence, there is no general consensus today that certain business practices always produce desirable or negative welfare e¤ects.
Secondly, the debate between di¤erent schools has extended from the economic arguments to be adopted in antitrust cases to the legal standards that the investigations should follow. 4 A wide range of proposals emerged, that can be roughly grouped into two sets: per-se rules that de…ne legality or unlawfulness with reference to the conduct undertaken, and discriminating or e¤ect-based rules that instead base the legal treatment of a certain practice on its anti-competitive or e¢ ciency-enhancing e¤ects.
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To sum up, several landmark cases have posed the issue of the indirect e¤ects of antitrust enforcement on the incentives to invest. The rich debate on competition policy has further examined the di¤erent components of antitrust intervention, that require to choose appropriate legal standards as well as enforcement tools. We argue that time is ripe to put together these ingredients, analyzing how legal standards and enforcement policies should be shaped to take into account the impact of short run monitoring and control of business practices on long run investment.
This paper studies the optimal legal standards and the enforcement policy to reg-3 See Evans and Padilla (2005) for a brilliant summary of the evolution of economic thinking in antitrust from the traditional view to the Chicago critique to the post-Chicago approaches.
ulate certain business practices of a dominant …rm which invests in research or in physical capital. Initially we focus our analysis on an innovative environment, where a …rm invests in research, moving then to physical assets. If research is successful, the …rm gains market power, the kind of winner-takes-all competition that we often observe in high-tech industries. Then, the fresh incumbent becomes subject to antitrust scrutiny when undertaking commercial practices. Its expected pro…ts, therefore, re‡ect the stricter or laxer enforcement by the competition agency on the practices adopted by the innovator. While the practice, applied to the new technology, is always privately pro…table, its social e¤ects may be positive or negative depending on the market conditions when the …rm undertakes it, something that is inherently uncertain at the time the investment is sunk. Antitrust intervention operates within the boundaries set by the legal standard, that specify when a practice is unlawful. Once the investment is chosen, enforcement a¤ects how the practice is adopted and the pro…ts realized (ex post deterrence); however, enforcement also in ‡uences the initial decision to invest, that is driven by expected pro…ts (ex ante deterrence). These two e¤ects determine the choice of the optimal legal standards and enforcement policies.
In this paper we consider per-se and discriminating rules, deriving the optimal enforcement policies under each regime and then identifying the optimal legal standard for given expectations of the enforcer on the e¤ects of the practice.
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Our main results are the following. First, we show how the optimal legal standard and enforcement policy vary when the enforcer's presumptions on the e¤ects of the practice become more and more pessimistic. Speci…cally, a more rigid per-se legality rule prevails on the more ‡exible discriminating legal standard for low probability of social harm: per-se legality acts as a commitment not to intervene ex-post, in the (unlikely) event the practice is socially harmful, boosting this way the innovative investment. When the harmful e¤ect becomes more likely, the enforcer moves to the discriminating rule and improves type-I accuracy to sustain investment. Second, we show that while ex ante it is optimal, when negative social e¤ects are unlikely, to commit to a more rigid per-se legality rule, once the investment is sunk a ‡exible discriminating rule would be preferred. Hence, there is a time-consistency issue that may require to use commitment tools (regulations, guidelines, precedents) . Third, we extend the model to include a positive e¤ect of the new technology on pro…ts and welfare 6 The welfare e¤ect of the practice depends on the magnitude of its social bene…ts and harms and the likelihood of these e¤ects, what we can call the "economic model" of the enforcer, or, in the words of Judge Frank Easterbrook, her presumptions (see Easterbrook, 1984) . These presumptions express the view of the enforcer on the expected e¤ects of a certain business practice. even when the practice is not adopted, adding an additional motive to invest. In this framework, the baseline pro…ts may be thought as guaranteed by patent protection, while the additional pro…ts that can be obtained through the practice are a¤ected by the antitrust policy. This way, we can consider in a simple setting the interaction of patent and competition policies. We show that, when the degree of patent protection is reduced, the region where antitrust policy opts for per-se legality, an extreme form of innovation-friendly antitrust intervention, becomes larger. In other words, patent and antitrust policies act as substitutes in our setting. Fourth, some additional room for per-se rules emerges, as a cost saving solution to enforcement, when …nes are capped at some upper bound: per-se legality is adopted for low probability of social damages, then replaced by a discriminating rule with more and more symmetric accuracy, with per-se illegality as the optimal legal standard when the new technology is very likely to be socially harmful. Finally, we show that, with minor di¤erences, our results on the optimal legal standard extend from the case of (uncertain) investment in research to the case of (deterministic) investment in physical assets, establishing a more general result on antitrust legal standards when investment matters.
We contribute to the literature on antitrust and regulatory intervention in industries. Immordino, Pagano and Polo (2011, hereafter IPP) propose an analytical framework similar to this paper. They focus on the choice between ex post law enforcement and ex ante authorization, identifying when each policy is optimal. In this paper, instead, we go more in depth into the selection of optimal legal standards, comparing per-se and discriminating rules, within the ex-post law enforcement regimes.
Hence, the results of the two papers can be read as complementary.
Another model that comes close to ours is that of Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2012, hereafter SS) . They consider a setting where safe and unsafe …rms decide whether to produce and may take precautions. Firms face uncertainty as to the liability for damages that will apply to them, due to possible judicial errors: a judge may mistake a safe …rm for an unsafe one, which creates a disincentive e¤ect for safe …rms.
Similarly to us both IPP and SS …nd that regulation should be softer when social harm is unlikely (our …rst result). But our analysis di¤ers in three main directions.
First, we focus on antitrust policies and its interaction with patent policy. Second, we enlarge the enforcer set of instruments to include the optimal choice of accuracy.
Third, di¤erently from SS, in our setting uncertainty comes from the unpredictability of market conditions at the time the investment is sunk, and not only from judicial errors. As such, we argue it captures a more general phenomenon than frictions in enforcement.
The impact of antitrust enforcement in innovative industries is analyzed also in a paper by Segal and Whinston (2007) . Considering a sequence of innovations, the authors analyze the trade-o¤ between protecting the incumbents, increasing this way the rents of the winner and the incentives to invest in innovation, and protecting the innovative entrants, that increases the rate of technical progress. They derive conditions under which the latter e¤ect is the dominant one. While the previous paper o¤ers interesting results on law enforcement when innovative activity is a crucial component, it does not consider the choice among di¤erent legal standards that represents the focus of this paper.
In Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009) a welfare analysis of legal standard is developed, which compares per-se rules and discriminating (e¤ect based) rules. The authors identify some key elements that can help deciding the more appropriate legal standard and the cases in which type-I or type-II accuracy are more desirable. However, the impact of enforcement on investment, that is key in our paper, is not addressed.
Moreover, our results, although motivated with reference to competition policy and framed in terms of antitrust intervention, give useful insights in the more general debate on legal standards and accuracy in the law and economics literature 7 .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 focus on antitrust intervention in innovative industries. In Section 4 we study the interaction of patent policy and antitrust policy, the e¤ect on legal standards of a cap on …nes and the case of deterministic investment in physical capital. All proofs not following immediately from the main text are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
In this section we describe in detail how we model the interaction of antitrust intervention and research investment. A …rm sinks resources in research, discovering with a certain probability a new technology and developing, in a second stage, business 7 Judicial errors and their reduction, i.e. accuracy, are a central concern in law enforcement: they have been analyzed in the standard model of law enforcement proposed by Kaplow (1994) , Shavell (1994, 1996) , Polinsky and Shavell (2000) and Png (1986) among others, which focuses on the (negative) impact of such errors on marginal deterrence. On legal standards see Evans and Padilla (2005). strategies to obtain pro…ts from the innovation. 8 The larger the initial investment, the larger, ceteris paribus, the expected pro…ts, since the probability of discovering the new technology increases in the investment itself. At the same time, the ex post pro…ts depend on how the antitrust policy deals with the business practices that the …rm applies to extract pro…ts from the investment. The laxer (stricter) is competition policy, the more (less) pro…table opportunities are opened if research is successful, boosting (reducing) the ex ante incentives to invest.
We …rst analyze the investment and the practice undertaken by the …rm; then we introduce the legal standard adopted by an antitrust authority to evaluate the practice and the enforcement tools used to in ‡uence the …rm's choices.
Investment and practices. We consider an industry that is initially competitive and characterized by fragmentation and symmetry among …rms, none of which has market power. By investing in research a …rm can discover a new technology that generates a strong competitive advantage and creates market power, the winner-takesall dynamics that we observe in many high-tech industries. For instance, the …rm invests to design a new operating system and applications for pc's that signi…cantly improve over the existing packages. The innovating …rm, if research is successful, becomes dominant and subject to antitrust scrutiny. The investment I determines the chances of success in the research process 9 : for simplicity, the …rm's probability of innovating p(I) is assumed to be linear in I, i.e. p(I) = I and I 2 [0; 1]. The cost of learning is increasing and convex in the …rm's investment and is assumed to be
The …rm can exploit the new technology by adopting particular business practices that allow to extract pro…ts from the investment. A practice can be undertaken at a di¤erent intensity by choosing an action a, making the design of business strategies a matter of degree rather than a yes/no decision. For instance, the …rm, rather than simply o¤ering an innovative operating system bundled (or unbundled) with the applications, can implement di¤erent levels of interoperability of its new operating system with its, and the competitors', applications, controlling this way the value of the joint use of these packages. The set of actions is A = [0; 1], where the lower bound a = 0 can be interpreted as not undertaking the practice at all. 8 In Section 4.3 we study the case of a deterministic investment in physical assets. 9 We do not model competition in research and patent races, but rather adopt the approach …rst proposed by Arrow (1962) to study the incentives to invest in research. We further discuss this issue in section 4.1.
Private and social e¤ects. When the dominant …rm undertakes the practice, this latter a¤ects pro…ts and welfare according to the intensity measured by the action undertaken. More precisely, the practice and associated actions yield pro…ts (a) = a > 0 which are normalized to zero when the practice is not adopted (a = 0) and correspond to the returns from "business as usual".
While the private e¤ects of the practice are always positive, its social impact may be positive or negative. Indeed, the way a practice a¤ects social welfare once the new technology is introduced depends on the occurrence ex post of a set of circumstances (market structure, conditions of entry, products o¤ered by the competitors, state of demand, etc.). This set of factual elements makes the equilibrium of the market game welfare enhancing or detrimental compared with the initial situation.
More precisely, the e¤ects of the practice are described by two states of the world.
In the bad state s = b, when the …rm exploits the new technology through the business practice, social welfare is reduced compared to the benchmark level according to the expression W b (a) = w b a 6 0 with w b > 0. In the bad state, private incentives con ‡ict with social welfare, that is, when the …rm increases the intensity of the practice, social welfare falls. For instance, limiting interoperability of competitors' applications with the innovative operating system marketed by the …rm restricts the rivals'ability to compete, with a stronger e¤ect the less compatible are the products.
In the good state s = g, instead, social welfare increases when the …rm undertakes the practice: W g (a) = w g a > 0 with w g > 0. In this case, there is no con ‡ict between private and social incentives since the practice increases both the pro…ts of the …rm and social welfare. Examples are when alternative operating systems are marketed, o¤ering additional opportunities to the competitors'applications, while the integrated package released by the …rm allows a more user-friendly usage of the software.
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Information. We assume that neither the …rm nor the enforcer know the social e¤ects of the practice at the time the policy is set and the investment is sunk, and they both assign a probability to the realization of the bad state. Later, if the research activity has successfully led to a new technology, the …rm, that has a better 10 In the benchmark model we assume that the new technology produces private and social e¤ects only if combined with the practice, while pro…ts and welfare do not change with respect to the competitive scenario if the practice is not adopted (a = 0). We choose this modeling strategy to focus on the impact of antitrust intervention (that a¤ects the adoption of the practice), on the incentives to invest in research. In Section 4.1 we extend the model by considering a positive …xed e¤ect of the new technology on pro…ts and welfare, that adds to the e¤ect of the practice described in the benchmark model. knowledge of market conditions, perfectly observes the e¤ects of the practice (state of the world s = b or g), while the enforcer imperfectly assesses them.
Following this approach, we assume that the enforcer perfectly recognizes the action chosen by the …rm, i.e. any a 2 A. Yet, the information regarding the e¤ects of the practice (state of the world) is less accurate and the enforcer can commit errors.
Speci…cally, the enforcer receives a noisy signal on the state of the world, that is whether the incumbent's practice is welfare enhancing or decreasing. The enforcer interprets the signal as follows: if > x then she concludes that s = b, where the threshold x in the legal literature is called the burden of proof.
11 With probability " I the signal is incorrect in the good state: when the new action indeed is socially bene…cial the enforcer considers it as socially harmful, a type-I error. Conversely, with probability " II the signal is incorrect when the true state is the bad one: in this case the enforcer fails to identify A as socially damaging, committing a type-II error.
Hence,
We assume that the signals are informative, i.e. "
The economic model implicitly adopted by the enforcer when considering a certain practice and its implementation through the actions, what we can consider as her presumptions, is summarized in the terms w g ; w b ; ; . In the remaining part of the paper we show that the optimal legal standards and enforcement policies for a certain practice depend, given the feasible policy instruments, on these parameters of the enforcer's economic model.
We impose the following restrictions on the parameters:
that ensures an internal solution for the investment in all regimes, and
which implies that the welfare e¤ect of the practice in the good state is su¢ ciently large.
Public policies: legal standards, …nes and accuracy. The focus of antitrust intervention are the practices undertaken by (dominant) …rms. Speci…cally, the enforcer designs the public policies to contain the potential hazards posed by certain practices and collects information according to the legal standards in place, to properly implement the enforcement policy. Each legal standard speci…cally de…nes under which circumstances (if any) the practice is considered unlawful, and requires to specify a minimum amount of evidence to convict the …rm. A richer de…nition of unlawfulness in general requires a more complex set of information, which is more costly to collect and may lead more frequently to errors.
The enforcer can choose among di¤erent legal standards: we consider per-se rules based on the action undertaken and discriminating rules that depend on the e¤ect of this action. Per-se rules can be further distinguished in:
L per-se legality: any action a 2 A is always legal no matter which signal the enforcer receives;
IL per-se illegality: any action a 2 A is always illegal no matter which signal the enforcer receives.
It should be stressed that per-se legality and per-se illegality di¤er in the power of the enforcer to …ne the …rm when the practice is undertaken, and not in the fact that the practice is adopted or not in equilibrium. Indeed, we shall see that even under per-se illegality it may be optimal to have the …rm undertake the practice at some degree (and pay a positive …ne).
Alternatively, the enforcer can adopt a discriminating legal standard (or e¤ect-based rule) that links the unlawfulness of a practice to its social consequences:
D discriminating: any action a 2 A is legal unless the enforcer receives a signal
Since in our setting errors occur only in the assessment of the social e¤ects and not when recognizing the action undertaken, they are an issue only under a discriminating rule, while per-se rules do not lead to errors. This is a simple way to introduce the distinction between per-se rules, based on a narrower set of elements but less prone to errors, and discriminating rules, that use a wider set of information but are potentially less accurate.
Given the legal standard the enforcer designs her policies through a set of enforcement policy tools, that is controlling the level of errors, and setting the …ne schedule. The enforcer can reduce the level of type-i error by committing resources to re…ne the assessment of the e¤ects, what is usually called accuracy. In other words, the enforcer can collect additional evidence, reducing this way the variance of the conditional distribution of the signal and estimating more precisely whether the practice increases or reduces welfare. We assume that the cost of reducing a type-i error is increasing and convex, and that if no resources are devoted to this goal the error committed is equal to ". 12 More precisely, the cost of implementing an error
Besides the level of type-I and type-II errors, the enforcer controls a third policy variable: a non decreasing …ne schedule f (a) 2 [f; F ]. The …ne may be levied on the practice, since the antitrust law applies to business conducts, while it cannot be related to the investment activity, that typically is outside the scope of competition policy. 13 Since the pro…t function a is increasing and linear in a, we can use with no loss of generality, within the set of non-decreasing …ne schedules, the stepwise function
Notice that, under any rule, the enforcer cannot …ne a …rm when it does not undertake the practice (a = 0). In the benchmark model the feasible set of …nes includes full amnesty (f = 0) and an upper bound su¢ ciently high not to bind the enforcer on the desired …ne. We discuss the case when the minimum …ne is positive (f > 0) after Lemma 2, and the case when the maximum …ne F is capped in Section 4:2.
Timing. The timing of the model is as follows. At time 0 nature chooses the state of the world s = fg; bg. At time 1, the enforcer commits to a certain legal standard i 2 fL; IL; Dg and sets the …ne schedule f (a) and the level of the errors " I and " II (accuracies). At time 2; having observed the legal standard and the enforcement policy set by the enforcer, the …rm chooses the research investment I, innovates with probability p(I) = I and in this case also learns the state of the world s = b; g. At 12 In this case the decision is based on a small set of evidence easy and inexpensive to collect.
13 Beyond this institutional argument, moreover, we could argue that private investment e¤ort is hardly observable and/or veri…able by third parties, that therefore cannot condition the …nes to I. time 3, the …rm chooses an action, conditional on what it learnt in the previous stage.
Finally, at time 4 the action undertaken determines the private pro…ts and the social welfare; the enforcer receives a signal that is incorrect with probability " I in the good state and " II in the bad state and levies a …ne (if any) consistently with the legal standard and enforcement policy adopted.
Optimal legal standards and enforcement policies
To evaluate the bene…ts of public intervention we start by identifying the …rst-best outcome (F B), which would be obtained if the enforcer could directly control the …rm's action and investment.
Let us denote by a s the action chosen in state s = b; g. The welfare maximizing actions are clearly a b = 0 (do not undertake the practice when socially harmful) and a g = 1 (undertake the practice at the highest degree when welfare enhancing). The associated expected welfare is therefore EW F B ( ; I) = I(1 )w
, that yields the optimal investment level
The …rst best investment I F B is increasing in the likelihood of the good state (1 ) and in the welfare gain w g . Since under a …rst best policy the practice is undertaken only when it is welfare improving, the investment always has a positive expected impact on welfare, and it is therefore always positive and increasing in the probability of social gains.
14 In what follows, the policy maker is assumed not to control …rm's choices directly, but to in ‡uence them via penalties. More precisely, the enforcer observes the actions a, and can condition the penalties to them, whenever they can be levied according to the legal standard in place, but cannot base the …ne on the level of investment.
We start with per-se rules, identifying the optimal enforcement in this setting, and then move to discriminating rules and the associated optimal enforcement policy.
Finally, we compare the two legal standards, evaluated at the corresponding optimal enforcement policy, and select, for di¤erent values of the prior on social harm , the overall optimal solution.
14 The expected welfare, evaluated at the …rst-best policies, is EW F B ( ) =
Per-se rules
The very nature of per-se rules is to treat the practice at any degree a 2 A as legal (Lrule) or unlawful (IL-rule) irrespective of the e¤ects (signal received). We analyze the optimal enforcement starting from stage 3, when the …rm chooses the action, that is the level of intensity of the practice. Since the practice is equally pro…table in both states of the world and per-se rules treat the practice irrespective of its e¤ects, the incumbent undertakes the same pro…t maximizing action in both states, no matter if it is welfare enhancing or socially harmful. The speci…c action undertaken, however, depends on the …ne schedule f (a) designed by the enforcer. If the research investment has been successful, the pro…ts at time 3 when the action is selected are a f (a) and the …rm chooses e a = arg max a a f (a). Given the …ne schedule (3), the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as e a f > f : The undertake constraint, instead, ensures that the …rm (weakly) prefers to adopt the practice (a > 0) rather than keeping on with "business as usual" (a = 0), and it is relevant as long as e a > 0: e a f > 0.
Then, the expected pro…ts at time 2 under per-se rules (subscript P S) are E P S = I( e a f )
and the pro…t maximizing investment is
Hence, although the …ne is not conditioned on the level of investment, it a¤ects the …rm's research e¤ort I. Indeed, the …rm realizes that it will pay f only if research is successful. Then, a higher …ne f increases the expected …ne, reducing the marginal bene…t from research and the associated investment.
We can write the expected welfare under per-se rules as:
where Ew( ) = (1 )w g w b is the expected marginal welfare of an increase in the intensity of the practice. The design of the optimal …ne schedule is equivalent to (indirectly) implementing, among the pro…t-maximizing actions e a, the one that maximizes welfare -which we denote b a -that is the action that the …rm is willing to choose according to the incentive compatibility and undertake constraints, and that is socially optimal. The enforcer therefore maximizes the expected welfare setting e a, f and f , subject to the incentive compatibility and undertake constraints, given the investment I P S .
Notice that although antitrust policy intervenes only on the practice (actions), deterrence works through two di¤erent channels: ex post deterrence on actions, once the investment is sunk and has been successful (marginal deterrence); 15 and ex ante deterrence on investment. This latter e¤ect works through the impact of the action implemented on ex post pro…ts and through the direct e¤ect of the …ne on the investment itself.
In the following lemma we derive the optimal enforcement policy under per-se rules. It's worth noting that by studying the optimal …nes we can implicitly identify whether per-se legality or per-se illegality is the desirable legal standard. Indeed, if the optimal enforcement policy prescribes to set b a = 1 and f = 0, it is optimal not to …ne the practice at any degree a 2 A. Then, the corresponding legal standard is per-se legality. If, instead, b a < 1 and f > 0, the practice is always sanctioned, possibly with di¤erent levels of the …ne, and, therefore, the enforcer is applying a per-se illegality rule.
Before describing the optimal legal standards and enforcement policies under perse rules, it is convenient to introduce the following thresholds
Lemma 1 (Optimal enforcement policy under per-se rules) Assume the minimum …ne is zero and the maximum …ne su¢ ciently high, i.e. f = 0 and F > .
The optimal legal standard and enforcement policy under per-se rules are:
1. for 2 [0; 1 ], the optimal legal standard is per-se legality and the optimal enforcement implements a g = a b = 1 and I P S = , by setting b a = 1, f = 0.
The expected welfare is EW P S ( ) = 2 [2Ew( ) ] and is decreasing and linear in with
2. for 2 ( 1 ; 2 ), the optimal legal standard turns to per-se illegality and the optimal enforcement implements a g = a b = 1 and
and is decreasing and concave in , with EW P S ( 2 ) = 0.
15 For the standard marginal deterrence problem in law enforcement see for instance Mookherjee and Png (1994). 3. for 2 [ 2 ; 1], the optimal legal standard is still per-se illegality and the optimal enforcement implements a g = a b = 0 and I = 0, by setting b a R = 0 and any f > . The expected welfare is EW R P S ( ) = 0.
Lemma 1 shows that the optimal legal standard and enforcement policy vary with the likelihood of social harm. The enforcement policy allows to implement the action b a by properly setting the …nes. The optimal policy discourages the action when it is welfare detrimental and implements the practice (at the highest degree a = 1)
otherwise. In this latter case, turning to the optimal legal standards, per-se legality is adopted ( < 1 ), while it is replaced by per-se illegality when the practice is socially harmful ( > 2 ). Since the investment is in ‡uenced by the …ne f , a third outcome arises for intermediate values of the parameter . When 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) the enforcer adopts a per-se illegality regime, but focuses enforcement on progressively reducing the investment by raising the …ne f , rather than discouraging the practice.
In other words, in this region the enforcer intervenes through ex ante rather than ex post deterrence. Finally, it is worth noting that the expected welfare is continuous and decreasing in .
Discriminating rules
A discriminating rule is based both on the observed actions and on the signal. An action a 2 A is illegal if the enforcer receives a signal > x. Although the signal may be incorrect, we have assumed it to be informative. The enforcer, then, can indeed implement -in contrast with per-se rules -di¤erent actions in di¤erent states of the world. Since the discriminating legal standard does not allow the enforcer to levy any …ne if the signal is 6 x, the …ne schedule f (a) applies only when the signal of the bad state is received. Due to judicial errors, this occurs with probability 1 " II when indeed the practice is socially harmful, and with probability " I when instead it is welfare enhancing.
When the practice is socially harmful, given the …ne schedule f (a), the incentive compatibility and undertake constraints give the following inequalities: e a b
(1
Although the incentive compatibility constraint to implement e a b puts only a lower bound on the maximum …ne f , when we turn to the good state, type-I errors are committed, and an excessively high f might induce the …rm to undertake a g = e a b rather than a g = 1.
16 Hence, we have to further impose the following incentive compatibility and undertake constraints for the good state.
Taken together, they give the following inequalities: e a b " I f 6 0 6 " I f . These constraints de…ne the interval in which the …nes must be chosen in order to implement a b = e a b and a g = 1, i.e.,
At stage 2, the …rm decides the level of investment that maximizes the expected pro…ts under discriminating rules (subscript D)
The innovative investment in the discriminating regime is therefore
Notice that errors play an opposite role on the investment: when type-I errors increase, over-deterrence reduces the investment while a higher probability of type-II errors, inducing under-deterrence, boosts the research e¤ort.
The expected welfare under the discriminating rule is
where
The optimal policy requires therefore to set the …ne schedule (f , f , e a b ) and the errors " I and " II to maximize the expected welfare under the above constraints. As before, we denote as b a b the action that solves this program (in the bad state). Finally, let us de…ne the following threshold
In the following lemma we identify the optimal enforcement policy.
Lemma 2 (Optimal enforcement policy under discriminating rules) Assume the minimum …ne is zero and the maximum …ne su¢ ciently high, i.e. f = 0 and F > . The optimal legal standard and enforcement policy under the discriminating regime are:
16 This is what Kaplow (2011a) de…nes as the chilling e¤ect of …nes on desirable actions. …ne to induce the …rm to choose b a b < 1 instead of 1 in the bad state. Then, " I , that acts as a substitute to the …ne in a¤ecting the investment, is reduced.
Lemma 2 shows that for a low probability of social harm ( < 0 ) the discriminating rule replicates a per-se legality regime. This result is due to our assumption that the range of feasible …nes includes full amnesty (f = 0). If, instead, the minimum …ne that can be levied in case of a bad signal is positive (f > 0), for low the enforcer would still implement the action at the highest level, b a b = 1 and apply the lowest admissible …ne, i.e. f = f > 0. However, in this case the outcome under a discriminating rule would no longer encompass the per-se legality regime, since the investment and the expected welfare would be lower under the discriminating rule compared with the per-se legality regime.
Optimal legal standards
We are now equipped to …nd the optimal regime, by comparing the expected welfare, evaluated at the corresponding optimal enforcement policies, under the per-se and discriminating rules. The following Proposition, proved in the Appendix, establishes the result.
Proposition 1 (Optimal legal standards) The optimal legal standard is a per-se legality rule for 6 0 and a discriminating rule for higher .
The choice of the legal standard depends on the ability of the di¤erent regimes to ensure both ex post deterrence, implementing the practice at the welfare maximizing level, and ex ante deterrence, inducing the desired level of investment in research.
When is low, ex ante and ex post deterrence may require opposite policies and legal standards. Indeed, ex post deterrence requires to discourage the practice whenever it is socially harmful; then, a discriminating rule is more ‡exible and e¤ective under this concern, allowing to be lenient when the practice is welfare enhancing and severe when welfare detrimental. Hence, concerning ex post deterrence, a discriminating rule is superior. Ex ante deterrence, instead, requires to discourage the investment only if it is expected to reduce welfare, and to boost it otherwise. In this latter case, that occurs when the social harm is unlikely, a discriminating rule may become less appealing.
Under a discriminating regime, indeed, the enforcer cannot be lenient when a negative signal is received, and a …ne must be levied reducing the investment. In this case, a rigid rule (per-se legality) may dominate a ‡exible one (discriminating) for its ability to commit not to intervene ex post on the practice when socially harmful, boosting the research investment at most. 19 In other words, when the probability of social harm is su¢ ciently low, the enforcer sustains the desirable research investment by opting for a more rigid per-se legality rule, as a way to commit not to …ne the …rm. When, instead, social harm is more likely, that is for > 0 , the more ‡exible discriminating rule dominates, allowing to better combine ex ante and ex post deterrence. 
Sunk investment
Since the impact of legal standards and enforcement policies on the investment played a key role in our previous analysis, it is interesting to discuss a di¤erent environment where the enforcer selects the legal standard, the …nes and the level of accuracy once the investment has been sunk by the …rm. This case may shed some light on two di¤erent issues: …rst, whether the initial commitment to a certain policy, assumed in the benchmark model, matters, compared to a case where the enforcer does not bind her hands before the investment is decided; secondly, which is the optimal legal standard in industries where new research investments are not a major element of the picture.
In the alternative environment we are discussing, the level of investment is given at the time legal standard and policy tools are chosen. Hence, the enforcer designs them considering only their impact on the action a. In other words, if the investment is sunk before the policy is chosen, this latter is designed to maximize welfare for a given investment. Drawing from our previous discussion, it is evident that in this alternative environment ex ante deterrence does not bite, and the policy is entirely driven by the ex post concern for the action chosen, that is the marginal deterrence issue.
Per-se rules, in this case, appear to be inferior, as they treat an action in the same way no matter if it increases or reduces welfare. Conversely, a discriminating rule, by appropriately setting the …nes and the threshold b a b , can implement the …rst 19 This di¤erence between per-se legality and a discriminating rule is particularly evident in the case, discussed above, when the legal norm does not include full amnesty in the range of feasible …nes, that is f > 0. In this case, the discriminating rule charges f when implementing the action b a b and does not succeed to replicate the per-se legality regime. 20 The role of commitment and ‡exibility of a legal system in a¤ecting growth has been recently studied by Anderlini et.al. (2013). best course of actions a g = 1 and a b = 0. Hence, if the enforcer selects the legal standard for a given investment, a discriminating rule dominates for any value of the probability .
Notice that the …rst best course of actions is also feasible in the benchmark model, but it is not optimal, being replaced by a g = 1 and a b > 0. Indeed, this way the enforcer reduces the negative impact on I. When, instead, the policy is chosen once the investment has been sunk, there is no reason to distort a b upwards. We conclude that potentially there is a time inconsistency issue that the enforcer can solve by committing to the policy and legal standard before the investment is chosen, for instance by adopting regulations or guidelines, or through precedents. This result is summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 2 (Sunk investment) Although ex post a ‡exible discriminating rule would be preferred, ex ante it may be optimal to commit to a more rigid per-se legality rule.
Patent policy, limited …nes and physical capital
In this section we extend the baseline model in three directions. First, we include a positive e¤ect of the new technology on pro…ts and welfare independently of the practice adopted. In this framework, these extra pro…ts may be considered the result of patent protection, while additional pro…ts can be obtained through the practice and are a¤ected by the antitrust policy. This setting allows us to study whether patent policy and antitrust intervention play a complementary role or act as substitutes in the policy design. Secondly, we investigate how the choice of the optimal legal regime is a¤ected by a cap on …nes, in the form of a limited liability constraint. Finally, we show that our results on the optimal legal standard extend from the case of (uncertain) investment in research to the case of (deterministic) investment in physical assets.
Antitrust policy v. patent policy
In this section we extend the baseline model to include a …xed and positive e¤ect of innovation on pro…ts ( ) and welfare (W ), that adds up to the impact of the practice on private and social payo¤s. Formally, if the research investment is successful, the …rm's pro…ts are (a) = + a, while welfare in the good and the bad state is, respectively, W g (a) = W + w g a and W b (a) = W w b a. In this setting, we can interpret the consumers'surplus W ; as an inverse measure of the degree of protection granted to the innovative …rm by the patent policy. The case W = corresponds to full protection, when the innovator does not fear any imitation by competitors and fully appropriates the bene…ts without transferring any surplus to consumers or rivals. Conversely, when W > = 0 all the bene…ts accrue to consumers while the innovating …rm is unable to retain any rent from the new technology, being immediately free raided by the rivals. This simple extension allows to study in a uni…ed way the interaction between patent policy (a¤ecting the …xed e¤ects) and antitrust intervention ( in ‡uencing the variable part that depends on the practice).
Apart from the …xed e¤ects, the model remains the same as in the benchmark case. Hence, we brie ‡y sketch the di¤erences in the analysis.
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Under per-se rules, the optimal investment and expected welfare are
and
When, instead, a discriminating rule applies, the investment is
while the expected welfare becomes
22 Since a complete analysis of all possible parameter regions is beyond the scope of this section, we concentrate on the most interesting case where the bene…ts from innovation accrue both to consumers and to the …rm (W > > 0) and antitrust policy is relevant ( + > W ). Moreover, this case is consistent with the benchmark model ( > 0) when W and converge to 0. We can now establish in the following proposition the optimal legal standards for di¤erent values of the likelihood of social harm, .
Proposition 3 (Optimal legal standards with …xed e¤ects of the innovation) The optimal legal standard is a per-se legality rule for 6 0 0 and a discriminating rule for higher , where
Proposition 2 shows that, qualitatively, the results on optimal legal standards are the same as in the benchmark model. Per-se legality initially dominates, and is then replaced, for higher , by an e¤ect-based rule.
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When the degree of patent protection is reduced, i.e. W is increased, the threshold 0 0 shifts to the right and we observe an expansion of the region where antitrust policy opts for per-se legality, an extreme form of innovation-friendly antitrust intervention. In other words, patent and antitrust policies act as substitutes in our setting. This result is reported in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Antitrust versus patent policy) Antitrust and patent policy are substitutes.
Limited …nes and the cost of ‡exible rules
So far we have assumed that the enforcer can use unlimited …nes so as to save on costly accuracy. In this case, the potential weakness of discriminating rules, which more frequently lead to errors and may require to invest in accuracy, does not play a major role in the determination of the optimal legal standard. However, if …nes are capped at some upper level, the enforcer, under a discriminating rule might be forced to change the mix of instruments, using more accuracy, with an increase in enforcement costs. In this section we explore how limited liability a¤ects the optimal trade-o¤ between per-se and discriminating rules.
According to Lemma 2 and Proposition 1, the optimal enforcement for > 0 is a discriminating rule that progressively reduces the socially harmful practice b a b and increases the …ne f =
as increases. At the same time, type-I accuracy is 24 It is immediate to see that for W = = 0, the threshold and all the equilibrium expressions in Proposition 2 converge to the ones in Proposition 1.
improved to reduce the negative e¤ect of the increasing …ne on the investment in the good state. Let us now suppose that …nes are subject to a limited liability constraint, F = . When social harm is unlikely, b a b is close to 1 and the …ne f is low. In this case, the limited liability constraint does not bind and the policy problem is equivalent to the one analyzed in Lemma 2. However, for su¢ ciently large, f cannot be set at the level required to implement the action in the unconstrained solution. More precisely, there will exist a 3 > 0 such that f = and the limited liability constraint starts binding. For > 3 , b a b becomes a function of the type-II error " II ; as can be seen setting f = 0 in the lower bound of (7) to get
By reducing " II (collecting evidence on the variables that help to better estimate the signal in the bad state), the enforcer is able to implement a lower (less damaging) action b a b , improving marginal deterrence. The following lemma states the optimal policy under discriminating rule and limited liability.
Lemma 3 (Optimal enforcement policy under discriminating rule and limited liability) Under a discriminating rule, there exists a 3 > 0 such that the limited liability constraint f 6 does not bind for 2 [0; 3 ] when f is optimally set. In this interval the optimal policy is the one described in Lemma 2. Instead, for 2 ( 3 ; 1] and is su¢ ciently large the optimal policy entails more symmetric accuracies ( " I < " and " II < "). The actions implemented are b a b = " II and a g = 1.
The expected welfare EW D ( ) is decreasing in and negative for ! 1:
It is interesting to observe that when the limited liability constraint binds, the enforcer implements a balanced reduction in both errors, a lower type-I error to sustain the investment softening ex ante deterrence on innovative e¤ort in the good state, and more type-II accuracy to improve ex post deterrence on actions in the bad state.
In the following proposition we summarize the optimal legal standards.
Proposition 4 (Optimal legal standards under limited liability) When …nes are capped by limited liability, the optimal legal standard for increasing values of is:
25 The same qualitative argument applies for any F 2 ; (1 ") . When F is capped in the interval above, the implementable action in the bad state is e a b = 1 (1 " II ) F .
i) for 2 [0; 0 ) per-se legality ;
ii) for 2 [ 0 ; 3 ) the discriminating rule with type-I accuracy;
iii) for 2 [ 3 ; 4 ) the discriminating rule with the limited liability constraint binding and more balanced accuracy on both errors; iv) for 2 [ 4 ; 1] per-se illegality.
Up to the threshold 3 the limited liability constraint does not bind, and the results correspond to the case in Proposition 1. When the likelihood of social harm increases above 3 , the (unconstrained) optimal …ne f exceeds the admitted threshold . In this region, the dominant legal standard is still initially the discriminating rule, realized combining the maximum …ne admitted with a reduction in both errors. When the social loss is very likely ( > 4 ), the expected welfare becomes negative under a discriminating rule due to the high accuracy costs, and the more rigid per-se illegality rule replaces the discriminating rule, saving on accuracy cost although discouraging the practice in the (unlikely) good state.
In the previous proposition we identify two di¤erent reasons for a rigid per-se rule to dominate an e¤ect-based regime. The …rst, observed in the baseline model, refers to more e¤ective ex ante incentives to sustain investment, that make per-se legality more attractive than a discriminating rule when the likelihood of social harm is low.
In this case, a more rigid rule allows the enforcer to commit to be ex post lenient when the practice is socially harmful, to the bene…t of ex ante investment.
The second reason rests on a cost saving argument: a discriminating rule better adapts to ex post e¤ects, but it requires more information and is therefore more prone to errors than a simpler, per-se rule. When …nes are unlimited, this potential weakness plays a minor role, since …nes act as substitutes to accuracy. When, however, …nes are capped, the mix of policy instruments under a discriminating rule requires to further re…ne accuracy, making this regime more costly. When the practice is very likely to be harmful, then, a per-se illegality regime that completely deters it, destroying also the ex ante incentives to invest, dominates a discriminating rule.
An interesting feature of our results refers to accuracy. We have seen that type-II accuracy can improve deterrence on actions, while the reduction of type-I error may sustain innovative investments. The possibility of re…ning type-I or type-II accuracy rests on the following argument. A practice may be welfare enhancing (good state)
or detrimental (bad state). Each of the two possibilities can be analyzed within an appropriate model, and their empirical predictions suggest a set of observables.
As long as the two sets of predictions are, at least in part, distinct, we can obtain identifying restrictions that allow to validate either of the two explanations. 26 Then, the enforcer can collect a minimum of information -facing the default probabilities of errors (") -or enrich the set of evidence. As long as the enforcer collects information on the (empirical) predictions of the competitive model, she is able to re…ne the assessment of the e¢ ciency-enhancing e¤ects, reducing the probability of condemning an innocent …rm, that is a type-I error. This corresponds to reducing the variance of the probability distribution of the signal conditional on the good state. Conversely, additional evidence of the anti-competitive explanation implements a better type-II accuracy, and reduces the variance of the probability distribution of the signal conditional on the bad state. Finally, collecting evidence on both sets of observables symmetrically improves the accuracy on both errors. 
Investment in physical capital
In the benchmark model the …rm invests in research activity, the outcome of the investment is uncertain, and leads to a new discovery with a probability proportional to the investment itself. In this section, instead, we explore a di¤erent type of investment, where the outcome is deterministic and the size of the investment is chosen by the …rm. The most natural reference are investments in physical capital, as for instance building a broadband network. The …rm, in this setting, decides the size of the investment I and the gross pro…ts are proportional to the size of the investment itself. The pro…ts from the broadband services are indeed increasing in the size of the network installed, that determines the number of (potential) clients and the range of services that can be o¤ered. We maintain the assumption that pro…ts are concave in the investment (decreasing returns) by assuming, as in the benchmark model, that the investment costs are increasing in its size.
26 See Polo (2010) for an application to selective price cuts. 27 Our analysis of the optimal enforcement policy has focussed on the choice of type-I and type-II accuracy, that can be chosen independently by the enforcer, while maintaining …xed the burden of proof (the threshold x of the signal ). Kaplow (2011b) instead analyzes the case when the enforcer controls the minimum strength of evidence x required to sanction a …rm. In this case the enforcer faces a trade-o¤ between a higher (lower) probability of type-I error and a lower (higher) probability of type-II errors. In other words, while setting accuracies gives the enforcer the possibility of choosing, at least to a certain extent, type-I and type-II errors independently, changing the burden of proof allows for a speci…c, inversely related, combination of type-I and type-II errors.
Moreover, as before, the …rm exploits the potential pro…ts of the investment by designing business strategies, that is choosing the action a 2 A. For instance, the …rm can impose speci…c restrictions on the access of competitors to the broadband network, either in terms of technical access or to access pricing and margin squeeze, including an extreme form of refusal to deal.
The pro…ts, net of the investment costs, are therefore 28 (a; I) = I a
The social e¤ects of the practice may be positive (good state) or negative, depending on the market conditions at the time the practice is undertaken, and are proportional to the investment size: W b (a; I) = Iw b a 6 0 when the practice reduces welfare and W g (a; I) = Iw g a > 0 when it is welfare enhancing. A more extended broadband network has larger positive or negative welfare e¤ects, depending on market conditions. The assumptions regarding information, legal standards, policy tools and the timing remain the same as in the benchmark model.
Although so far the case of physical capital may seem just a reinterpretation of the benchmark model, once we solve for the optimal investment, an important di¤erence arises. When the …rm is involved in physical investment, whose outcome is deterministic, its ex post realized pro…ts depend on the size of the investment (I a), contrary to the case of research investment, where the ex ante (gross pro…ts) are I a but the ex post pro…ts in case of successful innovation are given by a.
Consider …rst the per-se rules, where the enforcer implements the same action e a in both states. The incentive compatibility and undertake constraints, taken together,
give the inequalities: I e a f > 0 > I f . The net pro…ts at time 2 are therefore
and the …rm chooses the pro…t maximizing investment
Analogously, under a discriminating rule, the enforcer implements a g = 1 and a b = e a b in the two states. Moreover the incentive compatibility and undertake constraints give the following inequalities:
and e a b " I f 6 0 6 " I f in the good state, leading to the following restrictions on the …nes:
At time 2 the expected pro…ts for a …rm that chooses a g = 1 and a b = e a b are
and the optimal investment in physical assets is therefore
We can notice that, both for per-se and discriminating rules, when investment leads to a deterministic outcome (physical assets), it does not directly depend on …nes and errors, contrary to the case of investment with a random outcome (research).
However, the indirect e¤ect of enforcement on investment, that takes place through the control of the implemented action e a b , continues to work in the case of physical capital.
The di¤erence between research and physical investment comes from the di¤erent nature of the investment activity, whose outcome is uncertain in case of research while it is deterministic in case of physical assets. In both cases, the optimal choice requires to equate the marginal cost of investment and its marginal bene…t. This latter term, in case of research investment, includes the …nes, that instead have no marginal e¤ect when investing in physical capital. Indeed, in the case of research activity, the …rm realizes that it will pay f only if research is successful. Then, a higher investment increase the probability of paying the …ne, reducing the marginal bene…t of the investment. When physical investment is involved, instead, the …rm anticipates that it will pay the same …ne f in any case and for any positive level of I, with no marginal e¤ect on the incentives to invest.
Finally, the expected welfare both for per-se and discriminating regimes has the same expression as in the benchmark case. Although the optimal enforcement policies are slightly di¤erent, the result in terms of optimal legal standards is identical to Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 (Optimal legal standards in case of physical investment)
When the investment is deterministic (physical investment), the optimal legal standard is a per-se legality rule for 6 0 and a discriminating rule for higher .
Hence, our result obtained in the case of (uncertain) investment in research extends to the case of (deterministic) investment in physical assets. In both cases, when the expected welfare e¤ects of a practice are su¢ ciently positive the enforcer prefers to commit to a rigid per-se legality rule as a tool not to intervene ex-post in the unlikely case that the practice is harmful, thereby sustaining the (research or physical) investment. A more ‡exible discriminating rule, instead, is preferred when the e¤ects of the practice are more mixed, and a combination of control on the practice and on the investment is required.
Conclusions
We have shown in this paper that the optimal legal standards and enforcement poli- 
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We solve our problem by omitting the undertake constraint and verifying it ex post. The maximization program is solved by the following …rst-order conditions
Finally, the complementary slackness condition is
First of all, notice that the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind, so that = 0. In fact, if it were > 0; then f = F and should be zero to satisfy the complementary slackness condition, leading to a contradiction. Since = 0; the high …ne f can be any value satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint.
Notice that Ew( ) > 0 if 6 1 = w g w g +w b and Ew( ) > 0 if 6 2 = w g w g +w b . Then we have three possible cases:
Then, if we set f = 0, the investment is I P S = e a and, substituting in the …rst order conditions, we get
e a < 0 and setting f = 0 is optimal. Moreover,
(ii) For 2 ( 1 ; 2 ), Ew( ) > 0 > Ew( ) and the …rst order condition @EW P S =@f = 0 holds for Ew( )e a I P S = 0. Then
= Ew( )I P S > 0 and b a = 1. Substituting in @EW P S =@f = 0 and solving we get f = Ew( ) > 0.
Substituting f in the expression of the optimal investment we obtain I P S = Ew( ) > 0 that is decreasing in and equal to 0 when = 2 .
It is immediate to see that the only values of the action and low …ne that satisfy both equalities are b a = 0 and f = 0. Moreover, the incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed for any f > :
It is immediate to see that in all three cases the undertake constraint is satis…ed.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is organized as follows. First, we identify the equilibrium value of the policy variables; then we analyze the comparative statics of b a b and EW D with respect to . We solve our problem by omitting the incentive compatibility constraints (7) and the undertake constraints and verifying them ex post. The …rst order conditions are the following
where 
Finally, the incentive compatibility constraints (7) and the undertake constraints are clearly satis…ed. The expected welfare is therefore Ew( ) 2 . Notice that this outcome is equivalent to the one under per-se legality.
Consider next the case > 0 . We set b a b < 1 to obtain
< 0 and we get f = 0. Since f = 0 we have
< 0 implies that f is determined by the lower bound of the constraint (7),
. Finally, notice that the undertake constraints are satis…ed since
To check the second order condition, notice that only e a b and " I are set at an internal solution. Hence,
for su¢ ciently large.
Let us now turn to the comparative statics of b a b with respect to . For > 0 , rearranging from the …rst order conditions we get the following expressions of the implemented action and investment as a function of the optimal type-I error
Moreover, it is easy to check that b a b is increasing in " and " I for > 0 . Therefore, the expected welfare tends to 0 when ! 1. Notice that the expressions above are not the equilibrium value since they both depend on the equilibrium level of type-I error " I , and they can be evaluated only at the extremes of the interval. To further analyze the e¤ect of on the equilibrium value of b a b we can di¤erentiate the …rst order conditions with respect to b a b , " I and .
Then, we have that sign
Finally,
Multiplying the previous expression by we notice that
where the …rst term is zero (envelope theorem). The term in square brackets can then be rewritten as
or equivalently as
is smaller than one and w g > w b + : Then,
when (that is in the expression for Finally, di¤erentiating with respect to the expected welfare we get
where the …rst term (direct e¤ect) is negative and the last two terms are zero due to the FOC (envelope theorem). Indeed,
is negative because
(1 b a b ) is negative and the same is true for the term in the second square bracket. Hence, EW D ( ) is decreasing in .
Proof of Proposition 1. Given Lemma 1, the per-se rules give
Instead, the discriminating rule (Lemma 2) gives
Let us compare the expected welfare in the di¤erent regimes for increasing values of . For 2 [0; 0 ], both D and P S are equivalent to the per-se legality regime. In the interval ( 0 ; 1 ] the discriminating rule, although it may still implement the per-se legality outcome, chooses a di¤erent policy, implying that EW D ( ; " Proof of Proposition 3. Assume + > W > : The proof of the statement requires …rst to derive the optimal enforcement policy under per-se (step 1) and discriminating (step 2) rules and then the selection of the optimal legal standard (step 3). Since the proof follows closely the ones in Section 3 we will only underline the main di¤erences.
Step 1. First of all, we …nd the optimal policy under per-se rules. While the logic of the proof is as the one of Lemma 1 we …nd one more region and the thresholds are di¤erent. Therefore, we …nd it useful to go through it. Recall from the text the expressions for the optimal investment I P S = + e a f and for the expected welfare
: Then, the maximization program is solved by the following …rst-order conditions
First of all, notice that the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind, so that = 0. In fact, if it were > 0; then f = F and should be zero to satisfy the complementary slackness condition, leading to a contradiction. Since = 0; the high …ne f can be any value satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint. we have four possible subcases:
Then, if we set f = 0 and b a = 1, the investment is I P S = + and, substituting in the …rst order conditions, we get
and @EW P S @e a = [W + Ew( ) ] + Ew( ) > 0 then setting f = 0 and b a = 1 is optimal. Hence, f is not needed to de…ne the …ne schedule. Finally,
(ii) For 2 0 1 ; 2 , Ew( ) > 0 > W +Ew( ) and the …rst order condition @EW P S =@f = 0 holds for W + Ew( )e a I P S = 0. Then
and b a = 1. Substituting in @EW P S =@f = 0 and solving we get f = W Ew( ) + + > 0. Substituting f in the expression of the optimal investment we obtain I P S = W + Ew( ) > 0 that is decreasing in and equal to W when = 2 . Finally, and
: Finally,
: Substituting b a and I P S and rearranging we get
. Di¤erentiating w.r.t. we get:
Hence, in this region EW P S is decreasing and convex in .
and @EW P S =@f < 0: So that b a = 0; f = 0 Substituting b a and f in the expression for the optimal investment and for the expected welfare we obtain I P S = and
Moreover, the incentive compatibility constraint is satis…ed for any f > : It is immediate to see that in all cases the undertake constraint is satis…ed.
Step 2. Second, we …nd the optimal policy under discriminating rules.
Recall from the text the expressions for the innovative investment
(1 " II )f and for the expected welfare
The proof follows closely the one in Lemma 2. We only underline three di¤erences: …rst, going through the same steps in . Notice that once again this outcome is equivalent to the one under per-se legality.
Second, di¤erently from the proof of Lemma 2, showing that EW D is decreasing in is not enough to completely characterize the optimal legal standard. Indeed, we also need to show that for > 0 0 the expected welfare is concave in :
Therefore, di¤erentiating two times with respect to the expected welfare we get Step 3. We are now able to select the optimal legal standard by comparing the per-se and the discriminating rule, very much like in Proposition 1. Indeed the proof is the same except for the new region with 2 [ 2 ;
0 2 ). To compare the regimes in this interval we need three pieces of information: i) First, remind that in this region EW P S is decreasing and convex in : ii) Second, as in the proof of Proposition 1 it is still true that for 2 The …rst order conditions are
that hold as equalities with internal solutions " I < " and " II < ". Notice that for f = , f = 0; b a b = " II and a g = 1 the undertake constraints are also satis…ed.
Finally, the second order conditions hold, since
Di¤erentiating with respect to the expected welfare we get
where the …rst term (direct e¤ect) is negative and the last two terms are zero due to the FOC (envelope theorem). Indeed, Proof of Proposition 5. We …rst derive the optimal policies under per-se rules and discriminating rules, and then select the optimal legal standards.
Per-se rules: since the optimal investment is I P S = e a, the …rst order conditions are now, after rearranging: @EW P S @e a = [2Ew( ) ] e a + > 0;
@EW P S @f = 6 0; (24)
while the complementary slackness conditions is e a 1 + f f I ! = 0:
From the second and the third FOC's it's immediate to see that = 0. Then, f is determined by the undertake constraint, i.e. f 6 ( e a) 2 =2, since the optimal investment is I P S = e a. This condition holds for sure when f = 0. Since 2Ew( ) > 0 for < 0 1 = 2w g 2(w g +w b )
, we have that is lower than 1 for > 0 and decreasing in . Notice that, in case of research activity, the action b a b evaluated at " = " I = 0 gives the expression above. Moreover, being increasing in " and " I for > 0 it follows that in case of research investment the enforcer implements a higher action in the bad state than in case of physical capital. Substituting in the optimal investment we obtain: Hence, EW D ( ) > EW P S ( ). Finally, for 2 ( 0
